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Abstract
Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting
referenda, a design commonly promoted in nonmarket valuation exercises for its incentive
compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does
not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that people who sign an oath are as
likely to vote for the public good (e.g., wind energy R&D) in a hypothetical referenda
as in a real one. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of
preferences in the lab.
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1 Introduction
Stated preference methods remain a popular tool to value non-marketed goods such as envi-
ronment quality (e.g., Loureiro, Loomis, and Vazques, 2009), reduced risks to life and limb
(Svensson, 2009), and recreation (e.g., Deisenroth and Bond, 2009). But stated preference
methods remain susceptible to complaints of hypothetical bias – the gap between stated in-
tentions and real economic commitments.1 In general, the extant literature has collected a
long line of evidence that hypothetical bias exists across numerous types of mechanisms de-
signed to reveal preferences truthfully, including the popular valuation institution of binary
referendum voting (see e.g., Cummings, Elliott, Harrison, and Murphy, 1997).2
Social psychology offers one explanation of hypothetical bias based on the lack of commit-
ment to truth telling (Jacquemet, James, Luchini, and Shogren, 2010). Commitment theory
posits a person is more likely to tell the truth after first making a strong promise (see Joule
and Beauvois, 1998). Economic experiments support this idea. After pre-play communica-
tion, people who make verbal promises about future actions are more likely to keep them
when playing in both hold-up and trust games (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006). The solemn oath is a time-tested mechanism used to promote com-
mitment – the bond between a person and telling the truth (see e.g., Sylving, 1959; Kiesler
and Sakumura, 1966; Schlesinger, 2008). According to this view, the oath acts as a foot-in-
the-door that makes subjects more likely to comply with the content of their promise. In
addition, the commitment is stronger when the promise is freely selected and voluntary (Joule
and Beauvois (1998); Burger (1999)).
Herein we use experimental methods to test whether the oath will act as a commitment
device in referendum voting for a public good (university-based wind power research). The
oath is a pragmatic real-world commitment device that is publicly expressed, taken freely and
1While exceptions exist, hypothetical bias persists; see Diamond and Hausman (1994); Murphy, Stevens,
and Weatherhead (2005); Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2009a). Also in a survey of 39 CV studies,
Harrison and Rutström (2008) find that 34 of the studies considered suffer from a hypothetical bias, with
average hypothetical responses 338% higher than real responses.
2In 1993 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) appointed the Contingent Val-
uation Panel to determine under what conditions CV yields reliable value estimates. Among a host of rec-
ommendations, the panel reported that proper CV surveys should be administered via the voting referendum
format (Arrow, Solow, Portney, Leamer, Radner, and Schuman, 1993). A voting referendum has two advan-
tages. First, relative to alternative formats, subjects may find it more familiar and realistic. For example,
casting a vote on a proposition to raise taxes to pay for public roads is effectively a CV survey in which
the elicitation format is that of the voting referendum. Second, the NOAA report concluded the referendum
format is less susceptible (though not immune) to hypothetical bias relative to other formats such as an open
ended questionnaire.
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signed, appears an extreme and more accentuated commitment device than a verbal promise
or a written undertaking. In the “oath” treatments, subjects can freely sign a form by which
they swear to tell the truth in the experiment. Our experimental results support the notion
that the oath can reduce hypothetical bias. Under the oath, stated hypothetical preferences
decrease by a significant level, and we observe no significant difference between real and
hypothetical voting behavior. The oath seems to commit people to a behavioral act: to vote
in a hypothetical referendum as if it were real. The referendum results support the findings in
Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2009b) who observed that people bid more sincerely
after taking an oath in a hypothetical private good Vickrey second-price auction. These results
suggest the oath has promise (no pun intended) to create the commitment needed to better
link intentions and actions in nonmarket valuation, and perhaps beyond.
2 Experimental Design
We use a 2x2 experimental design in which the treatments are: (i) hypothetical and real
referenda and (ii) voting with and without a solemn oath to tell the truth. In the real
treatments, the monitor endowed each subject with $15.00 and provided them the opportunity
to donate the $15.00 towards a public good. In the hypothetical treatment, participants
were told to “imagine they have been given $15.00 ” and were then given the opportunity to
hypothetically donate towards the same public good.
The preference elicitation mechanism was a voting referendum. Subjects voted either “yes”
or “no” to decide whether each group member would donate their money. If more than 50%
voted “yes,” everyone donated their money. The public good valued was the University of
Wyoming Wind Energy Research Center (WERC). We conducted a preliminary survey to
assess subjects’ perception of the good to be valued. One hundred and twenty-one students
from introductory economics courses – who did not participate in the experiment – were
surveyed and asked the following question: “Do you consider the advancement of wind energy
technology to be a good thing? ” 93% answered “Yes”(113 of 121), supporting that a vast
majority of subjects consider wind energy technology to be a public good.
Prior to voting, subjects were given the following description of WERC,
Energy in the United States is largely derived from non-renewable resources such as
oil, coal and natural gas. Environmental scientists argue that in addition to providing
a cleaner source of energy, harvesting wind energy is important because of its renew-
able characteristics; the advancement of wind technology offers a buffer to dwindling
stocks of non renewable energy sources...important breakthroughs in technology must
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occur to increase wind energy consumption in the United States. To that regard,
the University of Wyoming will soon establish a wind energy research center. The
center will provide natural scientists and engineers with the ability to advance wind
energy technology. According to the School of Energy Resources (SER) director,
the Wind Energy Research Center will be “a program that’s probably as impressive
as anybody’s in the country.” The success of the Wind Energy Research Center
has and will continue to be dependent on private and public charitable donations.
Referencing why the center was not developed years ago, Jonathan Naughton, a
University of Wyoming professor of Mechanical Engineering, says that “The problem
has always been funding.”
Subjects then indicated their donation preference by circling either "yes" or "no" on an answer
sheet which was turned in face down.
Before each real treatment, subjects were assured that donations would be given to WERC.
An envelope and a check made out to WERC were presented to the group and it was announced
that, “After the experiment has ended, this check will be made out for the appropriate donation
amount and anyone can accompany us to mail the check to WERC when the experiment has
ended ”.
The only change to the procedure in the oath treatments is a preliminary stage based
on an oath form. The oath, provided in Figure 1, reads, “I, the undersigned swear upon
my honor that during the entire experiment, I will tell the truth and always provide honest
answers.” This solemn oath is distributed for signing before any information is provided about
the experiment. Note, the informational content of the oath focuses on truth-telling in itself,
and does not describe either the hypothetical bias issue or the potential shortcomings of CV
studies under hypothetical incentives. Signing the oath was not required to participate in
oath treatments, though no participant chose not to sign it. Note, this prevents the results
from being influenced by endogenous selection of subjects into the truth-telling promise.
All answers are elicited through a paper and pen survey, which asks for various individual
information (gender, age) and vote. In oath treatments, one last question is added about
how influential the oath was on behavior.3 To minimize the cost of the experiment, subjects
were solicited to participate in the experiment during class time and thus were not paid for
participating. All treatments were run in freshman and sophomore composition introductory
economics classes. This resulted in subjects being fairly homogeneous in age and place of
birth but diverse with regards to major of study, political affiliation and parental income (see
3The survey distributed in oath treatments is provided as supplementary material.
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Figure 1: Oath form used in the experiments
SOLEMN OATH
I undersigned ....................................... swear upon my honour that,
during the whole experiment, I will:
Tell the truth and always provide honest answers.
Signature...................
Appendix A).4 Another result of this strategy is that sample sizes depended on the number
of students in class the day of the experiment and thus varied across treatments. Overall, the
subject pool was 47.2% female, average age 20 years, 29.3% Democrat and 44% Republican.
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Table 1: Treatments and Summary Statistics
Treatment Sample size “Yes” responses
Frequency Percentage
Hypothetical no oath 68 60 88.2%
Hypothetical with oath 47 36 76.5%
Real no oath 37 22 59.4%
Real with oath 32 22 68.7%
Note. For each treatment, the Table provides the number of subjects and the number of
“yes” votes observed, along with the resulting share.
3 Experimental results
Table 1 summarizes the votes elicited in each treatment, and Table 2 provides the results from
non-parametric comparisons between treatments. Two key results emerge. First, we reject
the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist when voting over contributions to
wind energy technology advancements – confirming our ex ante presumptions. Nearly 88.2%
of the subjects voted “yes” in the Hypothetical no oath treatment; whereas about 59.4% voted
“yes” in the Real no oath treatment. As shown in Table 2, this difference is significant at the
1% level according to non-parametric proportions tests. Second, we observe a strong impact
of signing the oath on voting behavior in a hypothetical context. Signing the oath induces
a 11.7% decline in the “yes” response rate in the hypothetical referendum, with very high
statistical significance. In the real treatment, the oath induces a 9.3 percent increase in “yes”
responses, although this difference is not statistically significant. In such a real context, the
oath may work to decrease the number of protest responses, by which a subject returns a “no”
response in an effort to protest the experiment. Protest bids tend to decrease real, affirmative
response rates. These two effects of the oath seem enough to filter out the hypothetical bias.
Based on the proportions tests provided in Table 2, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
people who sign the oath are as likely to vote “yes” in the hypothetical referenda as they are
in the real one. This result supports the notion that people are capable and willing to provide
the equivalent of “real” responses to hypothetical questions after the oath is signed.
We asses the robustness of these two results by conditioning the effect of the treatments
on participants’ characteristics. Table 3 provides the results from a probit regression of the
4A survey handed out after the experiment ended asked subjects, in addition to the other relevant statistics,
to state the approximate yearly income of their parents, not their own income. Given the average participant
was approximately 21 years old, parent income was decided to be a more revealing statistic.
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Table 2: Proportion tests
Test Z statistic p-value
Real: with oath vs no oath 0.800 0.21
Hyp: with oath vs no oath 1.652 0.05
Real vs Hypo: no oath 3.405 0.00
Real vs Hypo: with oath 0.774 0.22
Real no oath vs Hypo with oath 1.686 0.05
Note. The last two columns report the statistic and p-value of 2×2 non-parametric com-
parisons between treatments.
decision to vote “yes” on individual characteristics and treatments effects measured by three
dummy variables (Hypothetical, Hypothetical × Oath and Real × Oath). The reference observa-
tion is a male from Midwest neither democrat nor republican in Real.5 The effect of covariates
is quite in line with what have been found in similar studies. Women were significantly more
likely to vote “yes” than men, a result consistent with the literature on charitable giving (see,
for instance, Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall, 2003, who found women are more likely to give
to charitable organizations when contributions are small). We find that being from the West
Coast (generally considered either California, Oregon or Washington) significantly decreased
the likelihood of voting “yes”. This support the results from Gittell and Tebaldi (2006) that
find substantial variation in charitable giving among U.S states. Additionally, while Califor-
nia and Oregon were ranked slightly above average in terms of charitable giving in 2002, they
find that Washington was well below average. Last, parental income does not significantly
impact voting behavior. Income insignificance is consistent with Forbes and Zampelli (1997),
but not Bowen (1999) who estimated Canadians with twice the income were twice as likely to
volunteer for public service relative to poorer Canadians.
The treatment effects are very robust to this conditioning. The coefficient associated
with the dummy variable Hypothetical is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating a
clear hypothetical bias. Being in the hypothetical treatment induces a 34.5% increase in the
probability of “yes” as compared to real. The interaction term Hypothetical × Oath measures
the treatment effect of implementing an oath in the hypothetical treatment. The effect is
5We also regressed the variance on Hypothetical but found no evidence of heteroskedasticity. The associated
LR statistic and p-value are -0.21 and 0.645. These regressions follow up on Louviere (1996) suggestion that
the distribution of hypothetical stated preferences may have a larger variance than that for real responses,
and Haab, Huang, and Whitehead (1999) point that heteroskedasticity should be tested and corrected for if
necessary in tests for hypothetical bias.
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Table 3: Probit regression
Coefficient Odds ratio p-value
Treatment effects
Constant 0.255 - 0.698
Hypothetical 1.140 0.347 0.000
Hypothetical × Oath -0.677 -0.213 0.032
Real × Oath 0.242 0.063 0.469
Participant’s characteristics
Female 0.628 0.173 0.007
Age (years) -0.002 -0.001 0.935
Income (×10k$ per year) 0.003 0.001 0.885
Pacific coast -0.561 -0.183 0.098
South -0.720 -0.249 0.191
East -0.620 -0.209 0.194
Democrat -0.004 -0.001 0.991
Republican -0.314 -0.089 0.269
Note. Probit regression of individual yes vote on treatment dummies and individual characteristics.
Joint nullity test: LR = 29.26 with p= 0.002. Obs. prob = 0.762 ; Pred. prob = 0.799
negative (-0.677), and significant (p = 0.032). Conditionnal on observable heterogeneity
of the subject pool, the oath induces a 21.2% decrease in the probability of “yes” votes in
the hypothetical context. The conditioning further weakens the effect of oath in the real
context: the oath induces a slightly higher (6.1%) rate of “yes” answers, which is far from
being significantly different from 0 (p = 0.469). A Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis
that Hypothetical × Oath + Real × Oath =0 (Wald=2.15 with p = 0.142). This indicates that
the probability of saying “yes” in hypothetical with oath is not statistically different from the
probability of saying “yes” in real.
4 Conclusion
Preferences elicitation methods – even relatively straightforward approaches like a binary
voting referenda – can suffer from hypothetical bias. Herein we explore in a referendum
experiment whether signing a solemn oath to tell the truth can reduce hypothetical bias.
Our results suggest the oath can work to eliminate the hypothetical bias: the oath causes
hypothetical “yes” response rates to significantly decrease, while real “yes” response rates
remained statically identical. Having subjects (freely) sign an oath to provide honest answers
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makes them more likely to do so even without any actual economic commitment.
Beyond the particular application of our results to contingent valuation studies, this evi-
dence suggests one can improve the accuracy of preferences elicited in the lab through com-
mitment devices such as an oath. This will remain a speculative interpretation of our results
as long as oath has not been applied to a wider range of experimental applications. Further
research will explore this avenue.
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A Sample characteristics
Statistic Percent (N=184)
Gender
Male 52.71%
Female 47.28%
Age
average 20
max 47
min 17
Location
Midwest 78.88%
Pacific Coast 10.32%
East Coast 4.89%
South 3.80%
Not born in the U.S 2.17%
Parent Income (k$ per year)
0 to 15 6.52%
16 to 35 8.69%
36 to 70 36.95%
71 to 90 12.50%
91 to 120 21.19%
121 to 200 8.15%
201 + 5.97%
Politics
Green Party 0.54%
Democrat 29.34%
Republican 46.73%
Libertarian 4.89%
Independent 18.47%
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